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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mediation is continuing to emerge as a highly adaptable and effec-
tive method for resolving legal conflicts in the United States. Mediation 
provides disputants with pathways toward settlement or resolution for a 
wide variety of conflicts, from divorce to multi-party community-based 
disputes to the redress of unconstitutional discrimination. Though unique 
in the myriad benefits it affords participants, mediation has been critiqued 
by progressive practitioners and legal realist theoreticians, in part for its 
uncompromising requirement of neutrality in the mediator. Many media-
tors pursue neutrality because they believe it is the only measure of the 
fairness of a mediator or mediation. In the context of multidimensional 
race- and sex-based inequalities in society, however, neutrality is an im-
possible ideal and notions of “fairness” are complex. This Note inquires 
whether and how mediators ought to acknowledge bias and attempt to 
facilitate fair mediations. 
Systemic oppression exists in many internalized, interpersonal, insti-
tutional, and cultural forms in the United States, and thus too often exists 
within and between mediations, mediators, and disputants as (uninten-
tional or unwilling) embodiments of, rather than exceptions to, the world 
around them. Indeed, critics of mediation argue that the informal, individ-
ualizing benefits of mediation can also function to isolate, privatize, dis-
aggregate, and moderate claims of collective injustice that, in their view, 
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would have been more fully addressed both on the interpersonal and so-
cietal levels by then-emerging progressive legal doctrines of the 1960s 
and 1970s.1 
Much of the criticism mentioned above culminates with a preference 
for traditional doctrine-based legal processes over mediation. However, 
this Note departs from the critics’ conclusions to find, in the malleable 
and evolving approaches to mediation, some ways of addressing these 
critical questions without disposing of the practice wholesale. Mediation 
can be used to interrupt and address systemic inequality. More so than 
traditional dualistic settings, such as the adversary legal model or the two-
party political system, mediation’s capacity to address multi-partied, 
multi-issued conflicts through “greater, wider and deeper participation in 
. . . legal decision making” can promote fairness between individuals and 
in society in general.2 
In what follows, this Note will first explore questions of bias and 
neutrality in relation to individual mediators and the mediation process 
itself. Though the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (“Model 
Standards”)3 assume mediators can be impartial, as the products of their 
culture and environment, mediators should aspire to awareness of their 
personal and procedural biases rather than pure neutrality. This Note dif-
ferentiates between practices of impartiality, neutrality, and avoidance of 
conflicts of interest, and will argue that, realistically, neutrality is an un-
helpful ideal if mediators are ultimately interested in facilitating a fair 
process. 
The second section delves more fully into notions of fairness. It will 
explore various definitions, differentiate between procedural and substan-
tive conceptualizations of fairness, and take the position that, because ac-
tual procedural neutrality is so rare, mediators have some responsibility 
for the substantive fairness of the agreement crafted between disputants 
of unequal power. 
     This Note concludes by highlighting models and interventions 
that some mediators have used to improve the substantive fairness of their 
 
 1 See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph Folger, Mediation and Social Justice: Risks 
and Opportunities, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2012) (discussing the potential of medi-
ation to produce “macro-level social justice”); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formal-
ity: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 
1359 (1985); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1545 (1991). 
 2 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 
347, 357 (2005). 
 3 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AM. BAR ASS’N & ASS’N 
FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), https://
perma.cc/TLG2-QT39 [hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS]. 
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mediations, and summarizes the critiques offered herein of the Model 
Standards. 
II. BIAS AND NEUTRALITY IN MEDIATORS 
In the field of mediation, impartiality and neutrality are widely ref-
erenced as ethical imperatives of the process and facilitator. Theorists 
have defined mediator impartiality as “freedom from favoritism, bias or 
prejudice.”4 Neutrality, a distinct but related concept, is the facilitator’s 
practice of impartiality through a symmetrical disengagement with, or 
distance from, each party’s interests or proposals.5 Impartiality and re-
lated concepts are “so central to the mediation process that they have been 
codified in the Model Standards,” which is a highly influential guide that 
informs the practices of individual mediators and has significantly shaped 
mediation ethical rules in most states.6 
For more than 20 years, however, mediators have critiqued these ide-
als of impartiality and neutrality as unfeasible in a world characterized by 
social inequality. “Parties and mediators all come to mediation with com-
plex systems of intersecting ideas, experiences, and perspectives that pro-
vide the lens through which each individual views the world.”7 Informed 
by the visible and invisible influences of their education, experience, and 
culture, absolute objectivity is generally unattainable for disputants and 
mediators. Having different cultural or personal experiences at the medi-
ation table can be a rich benefit to the process if such diversity is recog-
nized and utilized. 
The ideal of neutrality often imposes a barrier to the recognition and 
utilization of such diversity. “The vision of the lawyer as an objective, 
detached practitioner of specialized knowledge has permitted us to remain 
non-self-aware communicators.”8 Mediators tend to come from cultures 
of privilege—they are disproportionately white, well-educated, and 
 
 4 Michael T. Colatrella Jr., Informed Consent in Mediation: Promoting Pro Se Parties’ 
Informed Settlement Choice While Honoring the Mediator’s Ethical Duties, 15 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 705, 711 (2014). 
 5 See id. at 712-13; Omer Shapira, Conceptions and Perceptions of Fairness in Media-
tion, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 281, 304-05 (2012). 
 6 See Colatrella, supra note 4, at 709. 
 7 Susan Oberman, Mediation Theory vs. Practice: What Are We Really Doing? Re-Solv-
ing a Professional Conundrum, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 775, 798-99 (2005) (citing 
John A. Powell, The Multiple Self: Exploring Between and Beyond Modernity and Postmoder-
nity, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1483 (1997)). 
 8 Beryl Blaustone, To Be of Service: The Lawyer’s Aware Use of the Human Skills As-
sociated with the Perceptive Self, 15 J. LEGAL PROF. 241, 257 (1990). 
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higher-income9—and one of the effects of societal privilege is that it al-
lows its holders to ignore or disparage underprivileged experiences or mi-
nority viewpoints. Privilege often creates a mirage of objectivity—an as-
sumed universality of those privileged cultures and worldviews.10 
“Moreover, since mediators tend[] to be ‘haves’ themselves—educated, 
middle-class, non-minority individuals—they could lack sensitivity to the 
unfairness that a ‘have-not’ party might suffer in accepting a settlement 
induced by the mediator’s efforts.”11 
If mediators try to suppress—rather than understand and appreci-
ate—their particular perspective, they run the risk of perpetuating ine-
quality and harm. Psychodynamic, socioeconomic, and political factors 
contribute to an individual’s prejudices, often creating an experience of 
dissonance when contrasted with expressed public values of fairness, 
equality, and independent individuality.12 This tension might make the 
mediator uncomfortable, though that discomfort may be only one of the 
many harms caused by their suppressed perspective: 
[Neutrality] hides hundreds of strategic judgments that must be 
made—each of which can practically affect the benefits achieved 
by any party. It hides the normative judgments that a mediator 
must make about what are good and bad agreements under the 
practical circumstances at hand. And it suggests a technical ob-
jectivity, an absence of responsibility, a “good guy” image of the 
mediator that actually obscures not only issues of power and rep-
resentation, but the mediator’s own active influence on the out-
comes that may be achieved.13  
Bias can be expressed in a variety of interpersonal, cultural, and in-
stitutional mechanisms, such that even well-meaning mediators may re-
produce racist or sexist biases in a number of ways. This might include 
controlling the physical setting and timing of the mediation; affirming in-
 
 9 David A. Hoffman & Katherine Triantafillou, Cultural and Diversity Issues in Media-
tion, in MEDIATION: A PRACTICE GUIDE FOR MEDIATORS, LAWYERS, AND OTHER PRO-
FESSIONALS § 8.7 (2013). 
 10 See generally Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Comparative Judging of Civil Rights: A Trans-
national Critical Race Theory Approach, 63 LA. L. REV. 875 (2003) (asserting that uncon-
scious racism influences judicial conduct, implicating the enforcement of U.S. civil rights laws 
and other topics). 
 11 Bush & Folger, supra note 1, at 7-8. 
 12 Delgado et al., supra note 1, at 1375-83. 
 13 John Forester & David Stitzel, Beyond Neutrality: The Possibilities of Activist Media-
tion in Public Sector Conflicts, 5 NEGOT. J. 251, 260 (1989); see James R. Coben, Gollum, 
Meet Smeagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination on Mediator Values Beyond Self-Determination 
and Neutrality, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 65, 73-74 (2004). 
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terpersonal or positional relationships of power between the parties; iden-
tifying agenda issues; choosing or affirming language and communication 
styles; rewarding certain behavior; moderating a party’s demands or re-
quests; and including or excluding participants in the mediation.14 For ex-
ample, a mediator who requires that parties communicate calmly may be 
drawing on a culturally specific perspective about professionalism and 
respect. Doing so may actually prevent an inchoately angry party from 
recognizing and articulating mediatable issues, which, beyond damaging 
the efficacy of the agreement, “may amount to nothing less tha[n] an act 
of violence.”15 Without minute vigilance to interpersonal, cultural, and 
institutional dynamics during the mediation, the systems of oppression 
that exist within and surrounding the process and participants will main-
tain or deepen inequality between the parties. 
Many personal or cultural biases are subconscious or camouflaged 
as objective reality. A mediator with privilege therefore may never be in-
vited to reckon with the aspects of themselves and their processes that 
exacerbate power differentials between parties. Even when mediators 
seek to recognize and monitor their biases, they are often guided by little 
other than their own self-assessment, likely based on highly subjective 
indices, such as treating parties with respect or preventing abusive behav-
ior.16 The mediator should not rely on the disputants to point out the me-
diator’s biases. The emotional labor and potential costs to the party point-
ing out the mediator’s biases are an inappropriate burden for a disputant. 
Additionally, parties may object to the mediator’s most obvious missteps, 
but typically parties who are unrepresented or unfamiliar with mediation 
have difficulty identifying or proving a mediator’s lack of impartiality or 
neutrality.17 
Even if somehow the ideal of neutrality could be embodied by a me-
diator or in a mediation, the practice of even-handedness may itself be 
unfair. Given that the significant majority of disputes will involve some 
disparity of power between the disputants (whether it be racial, gendered, 
educational, economic, or professional), the “same treatment in circum-
stances in which the parties are not equal is, in itself, an improper favor-
itism—or partiality—toward the stronger party.”18 “[W]hen mediators do 
nothing or ‘remain neutral,‘ the outcome will tend to conform with the 
 
 14 See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR 
RESOLVING CONFLICT 327-33 (2d ed. 1996); Coben, supra note 13, at 75; Isabelle R. Gun-
ning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 55, 68 (1995). 
 15 Grillo, supra note 1, at 1572-73. 
 16 Oberman, supra note 7, at 799, 802. 
 17 Id. at 800. 
 18 Shapira, supra note 5, at 305-06. 
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dominant and familiar cultural myths.”19 Perhaps a mediation between 
disputants of identical situations and societal power would benefit from 
pure neutrality, but a blind evenhandedness toward an imbalance of re-
sources and needs between parties would likely heighten those inequali-
ties. Mediators, by acknowledging in their conduct and procedure an ine-
quality between the parties, might, therefore, act more fairly than they 
would by adhering to pure neutrality.20 
Indeed, express recognition of inequality between the parties and the 
cultural biases of mediators may function to increase the effectiveness and 
fairness of mediations. The mediator’s expressly identified interest in a 
particular cultural approach to professionalism or fairness is more likely 
to allow parties to see it clearly and to opt in or out of such approach.21 
Invited thus to recognize and weigh their own cultural narratives, all me-
diation participants, including the mediator, may be offered an increased 
self-awareness and respect for each other amidst articulated and legiti-
mized differences, rather than following unspoken mainstream traditions 
that exacerbate the inequalities of marginalization. 
In a world with no power inequality between the parties, no history 
or culture of oppression through legal or procedural assumptions, and no 
bias in the mediator or the mediation process, the ideals of impartiality 
and neutrality might indeed help facilitate a fair process.22 However, the 
American legal system has, since its founding, helped to create and per-
petuate inequalities based on race, gender, and other markers.23 Neither 
mediators, nor the culture in which most mediations operate, have been 
exempted from that heritage. Instead, through the lens of legal realism, 
mediators can effectuate inherited personal and procedural biases, and 
thereby too often worsen the inequalities between the parties. In addition, 
where parties are unequal in any substantive way, purely equal treatment 
by the mediator is its own bias. As will be investigated in the following 
section, mediators concerned with the fairness of the procedure may see 
in these realities the possibility of a legitimately ethical practice of dis-
parate treatment. 
 
 19 Isabelle R. Gunning, Know Justice, Know Peace: Further Reflections on Justice, 
Equality and Impartiality in Settlement Oriented and Transformative Mediations, 5 CARDOZO 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 87, 93 (2004). 
 20 See Shapira, supra note 5, at 305-06. 
 21 See Gunning, supra note 19, at 92, 94. 
 22 See Oberman, supra note 7, at 795. 
 23 From the Chinese Exclusion Acts and the waves of deportations of Latinx laborers to 
the institution of slavery, to the crisis of mass incarceration and beyond, the racist history of 
the United States legal system is undisputed and has not been wholly, or sometimes even 
partially, rectified by historical or contemporary justice movements or modern decisions by 
courts and legislatures. See generally JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND 
RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (3d ed. 2014). 
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Briefly, it is worth differentiating the avoidance of conflicts of inter-
est from the Model Standards’ mandate of neutrality. For example, the 
Colorado ethical guide for mediators does not require neutrality per se, 
but does require the disclosure of prior existing relationships that would 
explicitly bias a mediator in the eyes of the parties.24 Unlike many forms 
of bias, conflicts of interest arise from conscious, purposeful, and, by def-
inition, memorable conduct, or from a “relationship between a mediator 
and any mediation participant, whether past or present, personal or pro-
fessional.”25 Critically, the Model Standards simply require disclosure of 
“all actual and potential conflicts of interest” such that the mediator may 
continue their involvement if the parties agree.26 Regarding the far more 
nebulous and difficult standard, impartiality, the Model Standards simply 
require the mediator to withdraw if they are “unable” to be impartial.27 
Differences in treatment by the Model Standards aside, this Note does not 
intend to conflate the two practices or suggest that mediators are not ob-
ligated to disclose prior relevant relationships. 
III. FAIRNESS IN MEDIATION 
This section explores notions and dynamics of fairness in mediation 
and asserts that a more active pursuit of substantive fairness is a legitimate 
ethical choice for mediators. As set out in the Model Standards, many 
mediators pursue impartiality as an indicator of fair and successful medi-
ations.28 However, scholars have noted widespread difficulty in evaluat-
ing whether a mediation was successful.29 What criteria should be used 
and what indices, factors, or goals should be used in those criteria? 
Broadly speaking . . .a mediatory episode can be referred to as 
successful if it achieves ‘fairness,’ or ‘effectiveness,’ or any one 
or a combination of a plethora of applicable concepts . . . .This 
creates many problems for anyone wishing to evaluate the effects 
 
 24 ROBERT E. BENSON, COLORADO AND FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE: A 
GUIDE TO ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER ADR PROCEDURES § 24.5.3, 24.5.6 (3d ed. 
2017). 
 25 MODEL STANDARDS Standard III.A. Some scholars have noted cultural and other vari-
ations in the identification and impact of conflicts of interest. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
The Evolving Complexity of Dispute Resolution Ethics, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 389, 405 
(2017); Omer Shapira, A Critical Assessment of the Model Standard of Conduct for Mediators 
(2005): Call for Reform, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 81, 130-32 (2016). 
 26 MODEL STANDARDS Standard III.C. 
 27 MODEL STANDARDS Standard II.C. 
 28 See id.; see also Jacob Bercovitch, Mediation Success or Failure: A Search for the 
Elusive Criteria, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 289, 291-93 (2007). 
 29 See generally Bercovitch, supra note 28 (noting the nebulous meaning of “success” in 
mediation). 
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of mediation. How do we know justice has been achieved? Who 
defines it? An observer, a scholar or the parties themselves? And 
what if they disagree about what constitutes justice or fairness?30 
Many have sought clarity on these questions by distinguishing be-
tween mediation process and outcome, arguing that there are different cri-
teria for each, and sparking a field-wide debate regarding whether medi-
ators ought to be responsible for any notion of outcome fairness, in 
addition to procedural fairness.31 
Procedural or “formal” fairness indicators include practices such as 
evenhandedness, “process neutrality, disputant control,” and “consistency 
with accepted norms.”32 Other scholars highlight the requirement for dil-
igent scheduling and avoidance of conflicts of interest.33 Some scholars 
also include indicators such as disputants’ access to information and op-
portunity for self-expression during the mediation itself.34 However, these 
concrete practices “mean little to parties in conflict if they themselves do 
not think the proceedings are fair.”35 The perception of fairness or unfair-
ness, then, is a fluid and subjective standard and likely more important 
than any more measurable criteria.36 Perceived fairness has been meas-
ured by other standards of mediation success not at issue in this Note, 
including effectiveness of the agreement, efficiency, and disputant satis-
faction.37 If mediators pursue neutrality simply for procedural fairness, 
they may be better served by seeking more observable criteria such as 
satisfaction and effectiveness to measure how procedurally fair their fa-
cilitation was, rather than using the vague and difficult standard of neu-
trality itself. 
As distinguished from procedural fairness, “wide” or “outcome” or 
“substantive” fairness considers the mediation’s final agreement in the 
context of social justice issues in addition to the immediate dynamics be-
tween the individual disputants.38 Substantive fairness takes into account 
the social contexts, interests, and systems that impact and surround parties 
and mediators.39 Scholars have suggested many parameters for evaluating 
substantive fairness, including equity, unconscionability, legality of the 
 
 30 Id. at 291. 
 31 See id. at 291-92; see generally Gunning, supra note 19; Shapira, supra note 5. 
 32 Bercovitch, supra note 28, at 292; see Shapira, supra note 5, at 284-85. 
 33 Shapira, supra note 5, at 284. 
 34 Bercovitch, supra note 28, at 292. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 292-93. 
 37 Id. at 293-94. 
 38 Shapira, supra note 5, at 293; Gunning, supra note 19, at 88-89; Bercovitch, supra note 
28, at 293. 
 39 See Shapira, supra note 5, at 293. 
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agreement, effect on third parties, and benefit to the parties in comparison 
with their prior position.40 For example, “empirical studies make clear 
that if you compare monetary outcomes between mediation and small 
claims court, minority participants were worse off in mediation. However, 
minority parties were often quite satisfied with the process and the ability 
to tell their own story in their own voice.”41 Advocates for substantive 
justice should be concerned not only with the parties’ opportunities for 
self-expression, but also with the perpetuation of economic inequality ef-
fectuated by these mediations. 
Because the criteria used to measure substantive fairness are com-
plex and often limited, theorists disagree on whether mediators should be 
held responsible for the substantive fairness of a mediated agreement. Re-
sponding to those who claim responsibility for substantive justice, Joseph 
Stulberg and others have argued that such interventions would violate the 
mediator’s obligation of neutrality.42 Stulberg proposes that “[i]f the out-
comes are acceptable to the parties, then the process has succeeded,” and 
he equates “party acceptability“ with fairness.43 Regardless of standards 
or rules embraced by others, Stulberg argues that parties in a mediation 
“shape the outcome they find acceptable,” thus increasing “the probability 
that the outcome comports with [their] considered judgments about fair 
treatment.”44 From this perspective, parties will not engage voluntarily, 
access meaningful decision-making, or consensually relinquish their fun-
damental liberties should the mediator ostensibly become an arbitrator 
and impose requirements of justice that do not emanate from the parties 
themselves.45 Departing from his more conservative followers, Stulberg 
does not argue that procedural fairness requires pure fairness, only that 
the mediator’s obligation, and most essential and unique role, is to facili-
tate a mutually acceptable agreement between the disputants.46 Stulberg’s 
commitment to that central principle is echoed in the Model Standards’ 
disinclination to place the mediator in any position of judgement as to the 
fairness of the agreement.47 
 
 40 Shapira, supra note 5, at 293; Gunning, supra note 19, at 88-89; Bercovitch, supra note 
28, at 293. 
 41 Gunning, supra note 19, at 88-89. 
 42 Bush & Folger, supra note 1, at 11. 
 43 Joseph B. Stulberg,  Mediation and Justice: What Standards Govern?, 6 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 213, 214-15 (2005). 
 44 Id. at 216-18. 
 45 See id. at 228. 
 46 Bush & Folger, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice 
of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85, 88-91 (1981)). 
 47 Colatrella, supra note 4, at 714. 
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In contrast, Lawrence Susskind, Leonard Riskin, and Isabelle R. 
Gunning, representing “the dominant view in the field,” have advocated 
for increased responsibility for fairness of outcome rather than just a mu-
tually acceptable agreement.48 In the ethical codes of some states, media-
tors may be required to pause or end a session when participants are ap-
proaching an “unconscionable” agreement or when a participant is “using 
the mediation process to gain an unfair advantage.”49 This approach has 
become known as “facilitative,” “narrative,“ or “activist” mediation, and 
includes strategies to help disadvantaged parties address issues of sub-
stantive unfairness and to balance the power between disputants.50 As dis-
cussed above, some progressive legal thinkers have argued against the 
widespread use of mediation because its individualizing or informal na-
ture can harm parties who would benefit from formal legal tribunals or 
from alignment with larger movements against injustice. Susskind and his 
peers have engaged substantively with these critiques, claiming that more 
actively justice-oriented interventions by mediators can help avoid these 
pitfalls by engaging with legal standards, opening the mediation to other 
affected parties, or helping parties to contextualize their conflict in the 
historical, political, or economic environment.51 
Though promoting substantive fairness may threaten a mediator’s 
neutrality, making these biases explicit may promote greater, not less, 
participation by parties:  
[U]sing an intervention technique could certainly create the ap-
pearance of bias to one party or another . . . but . . . mediators can 
be viewed as biased through silence and non-intervention as well. 
Openly discussing the importance of values like equality and jus-
tice as part of the mediation process should work as some mitiga-
tion of this.52 
In addition to nuancing a mediator’s relationship with bias, this ap-
proach also offers a revision of the Model Standards’ requirement of neu-
trality:       
The real issue is how does the mediator’s concern for justice in 
the outcome [i.e. the mediator’s lack of neutrality] interact and 
 
 48 Bush & Folger, supra note 1, at 11-12. 
 49 Id. at 14-15 (citing MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY & DIVORCE 
MEDIATION, Model Standard XI.A (Ass’n of Family & Conciliation Courts 2000), https://
perma.cc/8KA5-CAVG). 
 50 Gunning, supra note 19, at 89. 
 51 Bush & Folger, supra note 1, at 11, 21. 
 52 Gunning, supra note 19, at 92. 
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intersect with the mediator’s concern for the parties’ self-determi-
nation? When a mediator considers intervening to prevent bully-
ing, stop lying or provide information in order to increase the 
chances of a just outcome, it is not at all clear that such interven-
tions violate party self-determination.53 
In summary, given that a mediator’s conduct could evidence bias 
whether they speak or stay silent—and especially because neutrality is not 
only elusive, but also a harmful goal—this Note finds that mediators who 
engage substantively to pursue just outcomes are acting in a responsible, 
ethical capacity. The Model Standards’ call for impartiality and neutrality 
seems rooted in two honorable principles: the promotion of disputants’ 
self-determination and agency, and the fairness of the process and out-
come. However, the most important components of procedural fairness 
are more effectively considered through the subjective standards of the 
parties and the efficacy of the agreement, and mediators can honor and 
engage the agency of disputants by connecting their stories to larger soci-
etal contexts, explicitly advocating for values like integrity and justice, 
and otherwise intervening to promote substantive fairness. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If the goal of the Model Standards’ impartiality requirement is the 
facilitation of a fair process, a more helpful standard would identify re-
sources for mediators’ self-reflection and self-evaluation, and require dis-
closure rather than automatic withdrawal.54 Given the realities of inequal-
ity, bias, and unconscious prejudice, the current Model Standards, if taken 
at face value, hobble the practice of mediation by requiring withdrawal 
from every mediation in which there is a cultural, gender, or other demo-
graphic difference between any of the disputants and/or the mediator. 
Given its potential for effective and just resolutions of conflict, the field 
of mediation ought not be so limited. 
Diverging in theory and practice from ideals of neutrality and impar-
tiality, some practitioners have begun to embrace mediation’s capacity for 
addressing substantive fairness. As mentioned above, these practices in-
clude mediators disclosing potential cultural and procedural biases; 
openly discussing values such as equality or justice; ending a process 
based on the unconscionability of the agreement; or recognizing the con-
 
 53 Id. at 93. 
 54 See generally Shapira, supra note 5 (leveraging a significant review of mediation liter-
ature in support of numerous proposed changes to the Model Standards, including the impar-
tiality principle). 
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flict’s larger contexts of inequality or history. Other mediators have iden-
tified innovative interventions that are still only modest interruptions to 
the process, for example including in an opening statement “a phrase from 
the more ‘value explicit’ peacemaker model like, ‘affirm that we all have 
the same need for self-respect, autonomy and pride.’”55 Mediators have 
also used a “check-in” to remind the parties to articulate their needs 
around fairness or justice regarding an aspect of the agreement.56 Some 
mediators offer legal and other forms of advice to unrepresented or unin-
formed parties (or recommend that they seek such information) before 
reaching any agreement, or even identify specific proposals for the fair-
ness dimensions of the agreement itself.57 These techniques—which 
openly address the inequalities between parties and their social or histor-
ical contexts, rather than ignoring and exacerbating them in the name of 
procedural evenhandedness—embody the increasingly common perspec-
tive that mediators are responsible for the substantively fair outcomes of 
their mediations.58 
This Note affirms that the increasingly common practice of attending 
to the substantive fairness of an agreement is a legitimate ethical practice 
of mediation. Engaging with important critics of mediation, mediators 
who advocate for substantive fairness during mediation take seriously the 
likelihood of mediator and procedural biases in mediation, and the field’s 
perpetuation of historical inequalities. Because mediators are each en-
dowed with a specific perspective and culture, likely ones which are priv-
ileged and falsely universalized, mediators’ commitments to neutrality 
and impartiality actually undercut, rather than ensure, fairness. In combi-
nation with ethical principles such as party self-determination, disclosure 
of conflicts of interest, and other standards of “mediation success” not at 
issue here, a more realistic engagement with mediator and procedural bias 
would create significant gains toward an ethic of mediation that is both 
procedurally and substantively fair. If mediators did more to articulate 
their own perspectives and address the disparate resources and needs of 
the disputants, mediation would continue to evolve to effectively meet the 
needs of disputants and help create more sustainable, effective, and mean-
ingful resolutions to conflicts large and small. 
 
 55 Gunning, supra note 19, at 94. 
 56 Id. at 95. 
 57 Bush & Folger, supra note 1, at 13. 
 58 Id. at 11. 
